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Such is the rhetorical appeal of the idea of liberty that a variety of political philosophies 
claim to honour it. Republicans and Marxists, no less than libertarians and liberals, 
maintain that they and they alone are the true defenders of freedom. The literature of 
contemporary political theory is thus replete with rival analyses of the meaning of 
liberty, and disputes about its measurement, distribution and institutional require-
ments. Our aim here is to gain some understanding of the meaning and the conditions 
of liberty by working through the thicket of contemporary argument, though we may 
have to rest content with a better knowledge of the terrain.
The Concept of Liberty
Contemporary discussion of the concept of liberty has been most profoundly shaped by 
the analysis of Isaiah Berlin. In his essay ‘Two concepts of liberty’, Berlin argues that, 
in the history of ideas, liberty has had two quite different meanings or senses. In the 
fi rst, ‘negative’ sense of the word, a person is free ‘to the degree to which no man or 
body of men interferes’ with his activity. ‘Political liberty in this sense is simply the area 
within which a man can act unobstructed by others’ (Berlin, 1979a, p. 122). In the 
second, ‘positive’ sense of the word, a person is free to the extent that he is his own 
master, whose life and decisions depend upon himself and not upon external forces of 
any kind. A person who is autonomous or self-determining – who is ‘a thinking, willing, 
active being, bearing responsibility for [his] own choices and able to explain them by 
references to [his] own ideas and purposes’ – is ‘positively’ free (Berlin, 1979a, p. 31).
Whether or not such a distinction can properly be drawn might be disputed. In 
Berlin’s analysis, the contrast is more readily seen if we recognize that the positive and 
negative concepts of liberty are responses to ‘logically distinct’ questions. If one asks, 
‘Who governs me?’, the answer will reveal the extent of one’s positive liberty: someone 
who can reply, ‘I govern myself’, is positively free. If, on the other hand, one asks, ‘How 
far do others interfere with me?’, the answer will reveal the extent of one’s negative 
liberty: someone who can answer, ‘very little’, is negatively free. In general, a person 
enjoys greater negative liberty to the extent that he is unimpeded or unconstrained by 
other human agents and can act without being interfered with. On this view, a lack of 
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ability does not mean a lack of freedom – I am not unfree because I am unable to under-
stand Hegel. However, if my inability is due to human arrangements that obstruct or 
interfere with me, then I am negatively unfree.
In drawing the contrast between negative and positive liberty, Berlin thinks he has 
identifi ed an important conceptual distinction. But it is also a part of his concern to 
criticize positive conceptions of freedom. His criticisms are worth considering because 
they open up a number of issues which must be tackled in order to come to terms with 
the notion of freedom. Berlin presents his criticisms in the form of an account of the 
historical development of the negative and positive notions of liberty. Positive libertar-
ians begin by invoking the harmless metaphor of self-mastery, maintaining that one is 
free if one is one’s own master and a slave to no man. But they go on to suggest that 
one might equally be a slave to nature, or to one’s own unbridled passions, or indeed 
to one’s lower self. At this point, Berlin maintains, they proceed to develop a distinction 
between two selves: the dominant self, invariably identifi ed with reason and man’s 
‘higher nature’, which is also the ‘real’ or ‘ideal’ or the ‘autonomous’ self – the self ‘at 
its best’; and the ‘lower’, ‘empirical’ or ‘heteronomous’ self, which is the self of irratio-
nal impulse and uncontrolled desire, ‘swept by every gust of desire and passion, needing 
to be rigidly disciplined if it is ever to rise to the full height of its “real nature” ’ (Berlin, 
1979a, p. 132). From here it is a short step to claim that the real self may be best 
understood as something greater than the individual, as a social whole (such as a tribe 
or a state) of which the individual is only a part. ‘This entity is then identifi ed as being 
the “true” self which, by imposing its collective, or “organic”, single will upon its recal-
citrant “members”, achieves its own, and therefore their, “higher” freedom’ (ibid.). This 
positive libertarian understanding of freedom, according to Berlin, has in this way 
made it easy to justify coercing people, for the coercion is of the lower self by the higher, 
and such coercion is deemed not only consistent with but required by freedom.
Berlin is careful enough to concede that even negative libertarians could make such 
questionable philosophical moves, by maintaining, for example, that only the individ-
ual’s real or higher self should not be constrained or interfered with. They too might 
argue that obstructing the individual’s actual wishes would better serve his real desires. 
Nonetheless, Berlin insists, ‘the “positive” conception of freedom as self-mastery, with 
its suggestion of a man divided against himself, has, in fact, and as matter of history, 
of doctrine and of practice lent itself more easily to this splitting of personality into two’ 
(ibid., p. 134). Indeed, he suggests that ‘socialized’ forms of the ‘positive doctrine of 
liberation by reason’ lie at the heart of many of the nationalist, communist, authoritar-
ian and totalitarian creeds of today (ibid., p. 144).
But these propositions, and Berlin’s famous distinction between negative and posi-
tive liberty, have not gone unchallenged. Gerald MacCallum, in his almost as famous 
paper, ‘Negative and positive freedom’, rejects Berlin’s distinction between two con-
cepts of liberty. Freedom, he maintains, is always one and the same triadic relation: 
‘Whenever the freedom of some agent or agents is in question, it is always freedom from 
some constraint or restriction on, interference with, or barrier to doing, not doing, 
becoming, or not becoming something’ (MacCallum, 1991, p. 102). Freedom is always 
of something (an agent or agents), from something, to do or not do, become or not 
become, something. Any statement about freedom must take the form ‘x is (is not) 
free from y to do (not do) z’, where x ranges over agents, y ranges over constraints, 
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restrictions, interferences or barriers, and z ranges over actions or conditions of char-
acter or circumstance.
MacCallum does not deny that there might be uncertainty, or even disagreement, 
about what counts as an agent or about what counts as a constraint or restriction. But 
this does not alter his view that there is only a single triadic concept of liberty. Thus he 
rejects Berlin’s distinction between negative or ‘freedom from’, and positive or ‘freedom 
to’ concepts of liberty (Berlin, 1979a, p. 131) on the grounds that any statement about 
liberty is a statement about the freedom of x from y to z. Berlin, in a reply to his critics, 
concedes that the terms ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ liberty ‘start at no great logical dis-
tance from each other’, and that the questions ‘Who is master?’ and ‘Over what area 
am I master?’ ‘cannot be kept wholly distinct’ (Berlin, 1979b, p. xliii). Indeed, 
MacCallum’s understanding of liberty as a single triadic concept has been endorsed by 
a number of contemporary theorists, including Benn and Weinstein (1971, p. 194), 
Rawls (1971, p. 202), Feinberg (1980, pp. 3–4) and T. Gray (1990, pp. 11–16).
Nevertheless, others have argued that MacCallum’s triadic formula does not capture 
all there is to the concept of liberty (J. Gray, 1984, pp. 326–7), though there is also 
disagreement over whether Berlin has in fact distinguished different concepts of liberty 
or merely identifi ed two kinds of conceptions of liberty. To some extent the question of 
whether there are two concepts or one is a matter to be settled by convention. In 
Berlin’s favour it might be said that a distinction between negative and positive liberty 
has been drawn and widely employed. On the other hand, not all usages of the distinc-
tion have conformed to Berlin’s original. One common way of drawing the distinction 
has been as a contrast between the opportunities available to a person (negative liberty) 
and the capacity or the resources that person has to take advantage of them (positive 
liberty). As Levin expresses it, ‘a man is positively free when he is doing what he wants 
to do, and negatively free when no one is interfering with him’ (Levin, 1984, p. 85). 
Rawls (1971, p. 204) suggests that the ‘inability to take advantage of one’s rights and 
opportunities as a result of poverty and ignorance, and a lack of means generally’ 
should not be counted as among the constraints defi nitive of liberty. Instead, he main-
tains, we should distinguish between liberty and the worth of liberty. But for some 
proponents of the negative/positive distinction, the correct inference to be drawn from 
this way of viewing matters is that both opportunities (or negative liberties) and 
resources (positive liberties) must be viewed as different but equally important dimen-
sions of liberty (Goodin, 1982, p. 152).
Yet while this kind of analysis has been infl uential, there are other philosophers who 
have tried to show that a much deeper distinction exists between negative and positive 
liberty. A particularly infl uential discussion of the distinction is offered by Charles 
Taylor, who suggests that negative freedom is usually an ‘opportunity concept’, while 
positive freedom is always an ‘exercise concept’ (Taylor, 1979). In Taylor’s analysis, 
negative liberty is usually an opportunity concept because it suggests that ‘being free 
is a matter of what we can do, of what it is open to us to do, whether or not we do 
anything to exercise these options’. This is so, he says, with the negative conceptions 
of freedom employed by Hobbes and Bentham. Positive freedom, however, is an exercise 
concept because doctrines of positive freedom ‘are concerned with a view of freedom 
which involves essentially the exercising of control over one’s life. On this view, one is 
free only to the extent that one has effectively determined oneself and the shape of one’s 
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life’ (ibid., p. 176). The key to Taylor’s distinction, as he understands it, lies in the fact 
that the opportunity concept sees only ‘external’ obstacles to action as obstacles to 
freedom. By contrast, to recognize freedom as an exercise concept is to accept that the 
‘internal’ obstacles of the mind, which affect our motivations, our self-control and our 
capacity for moral discrimination, also affect our freedom (ibid., p. 179).
One problem with Taylor’s view is that it is not clear why, for the negative libertar-
ian, only external obstacles count. ‘Internal’ impediments to action may just as easily 
be regarded as obstacles that affect an individual’s freedom. Physical barriers, legal 
prohibitions and credible threats reduce my negative liberty since they are impediments 
or constraints upon my action. But my negative liberty is similarly reduced if I am 
drugged or brainwashed, or if I am manipulated or deceived into taking particular 
actions: the ‘internal’ obstacles reducing my liberty are the false beliefs with which I 
have been inculcated.
Now, Taylor argues that, once it is conceded that ‘internal’ obstacles restrict freedom, 
the negative libertarian is no longer using freedom as an opportunity concept but is 
using it as an exercise concept. This is because to be free of internal obstacles invariably 
involves actively ‘exercising’ freedom by removing those internal barriers (ibid., 
pp. 177–8). This seems to be a mistake. While removing or surmounting internal 
obstacles, such as fears or anxieties, involves action, the same is also true of the over-
coming of external obstacles. Whether or not activity is required to enjoy freedom is 
irrelevant. Furthermore, as Baldwin tellingly observes, one might agree that overcom-
ing internal obstacles involves one in action, ‘but it does not follow that the freedom 
thereby attained is more than an opportunity to act’ (Baldwin, 1984, pp. 131–2).
Negative freedom, then, I would suggest, is always to be understood as an opportu-
nity concept; but the contrast to be drawn is not between negative liberty meaning the 
mere absence of external obstacles and positive liberty meaning the active overcoming 
of internal obstacles. Negative liberty is what an agent enjoys when there are no 
humanly imposed impediments, internal or external, to action.
There is, however, a further question about the concept of freedom: can we refer 
simply to freedom as a fundamental good that we can all have more or less of, or does 
it make sense to think only of specifi c freedoms – the freedom to speak or the freedom 
to emigrate, for example? Those who advance the ‘specifi c-freedom thesis’ (Carter, 
1999, pp. 11ff.) deny that there is any such thing as ‘freedom’ in itself, and therefore 
deny that freedom is itself a fundamental good. Freedom is not a commodity to be 
weighed and measured (Benn and Peters, 1959, p. 214), and it makes no sense, they 
suggest, to think we can have a right to liberty as such (Dworkin, 1979). Ian Carter, 
however, has suggested that the concept of ‘overall freedom’ has been mistakenly 
rejected (Carter, 1999). The defenders of the specifi c-freedom thesis have denied that 
there is any such thing as overall freedom, argued that overall freedom cannot be 
measured, and concluded that there is no point in measuring overall freedom. If these 
claims hold, it would make little sense to make statements of the following sort: Alf is 
freer than Betty; or Britain is freer than China – unless one means by such remarks that 
Alf or British citizens enjoy specifi c liberties not available to Betty or people in China. 
Carter’s ambition is to show not only that it makes sense to think in terms of overall 
freedom but also that freedom can successfully be measured. (For a more recent account 
of how freedom might be measured see Kramer, 2003.)
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Conceptions of Negative Liberty
Among those who conceive of liberty in negative terms there is still disagreement about 
when an individual can be said to be free. Although all might concur that liberty means 
an absence of impediments or constraints or interference, there remains the question 
of what is to count as a constraint which makes us unfree. There are also the questions 
of who (or what) is the subject of freedom, and what it is that the free subject is free to 
do. The fi rst of these three questions is undoubtedly the most problematic for an account 
of liberty, but something should be said about the latter two.
Generally, theories of liberty assume that the subject of freedom is the individual. 
G. A. Cohen, however, has suggested that there may be good reason to recognize the 
collective dimensions of freedom and unfreedom, arguing that while members of the 
proletarian class are held to be free because they are at liberty to leave the proletariat 
this does not alter the fact of their unfreedom, since they are not free collectively or as a 
class to leave the proletariat (Cohen, 1979, pp. 21–5). Under capitalist institutions, 
even though anyone might rise up from the proletariat, it is not possible for everyone 
to do so since capitalism requires ‘a substantial hired labour force, which would not 
exist if more than just a few workers rose’ (ibid., p. 21). This way of viewing liberty is 
important for Cohen because it bears upon claims made about freedom under capital-
ism. The position of the proletariat he holds to be analogous to that of a group of 
imprisoned individuals who have the opportunity for only one of their number to 
escape. Since all cannot escape, even though each has an opportunity to do so, the group 
is collectively unfree or unfree as a class.
Cohen’s paper has been widely discussed, but it is not clear that thinking about the 
subject of freedom in these collective terms adds a great deal to our understanding of 
the notion. At the very least, it is odd to think that we are in any signifi cant way unfree 
to do something simply because we cannot all do it at the same time. We cannot all 
claim unemployment benefi ts at the same time, nor can we all become plumbers or 
professors of political theory, but this does not mean that we are unfree to do or become 
any of these things (J. Gray, 1986, p. 166).
The second question which needs to be asked is that of what the subject of freedom 
must be free to do if liberty is to be enjoyed. One might say, for example, that to be free 
the subject must have the opportunity to exercise traditional liberties, or to do what he 
desires, or to do anything. At fi rst sight it appears that to be free one must have the 
opportunity to do what one wants or desires. The diffi culty with this position is that it 
means that liberty can be increased by trimming or reducing desires. Thus the con-
tented slave could be seen as free because he has no desire to escape. This problem was 
raised in criticism of Berlin’s original formulation of the notion of liberty (McFarlane, 
1966, pp. 77–81). Berlin’s response was to acknowledge that the ‘extent of my social 
or political freedom consists in the absence of obstacles not merely to my actual, but to 
my potential choices – to my acting in this or that way if I choose to do so’ (Berlin, 
1979b). On this view, then, an individual enjoys negative liberty if he is not obstructed 
or interfered with should he seek to perform an action. Generally, this account of the 




The more diffi cult problem in accounting for negative liberty is in answering the 
question of what counts as an obstacle or interference. Here, there is a greater variety 
of views on offer, and conceptions of liberty generally differ on the basis of their answers 
to this question. A clear, if uncompromising, answer to the question is offered by Hillel 
Steiner: ‘An individual is unfree if, and only if, his doing of any action is rendered impos-
sible by the action of another individual’ (Steiner, 1991, p. 123, emphasis added; 
Steiner, 1994, ch 1; see also Parent, 1974). If an individual is still able to perform an 
action, even if someone has made doing so extremely undesirable, the individual 
remains free. In this regard, threats and penalties do not make anyone unfree to perform 
an action since they leave open the option of performing the action and incurring its 
costs. Indeed, these kinds of threatening interventions are indistinguishable from offers, 
and neither diminishes liberty; in both cases the intervention alters the desirability of 
performing the action, but not the possibility of doing so. Steiner’s reasons for taking 
this path are not diffi cult to discern: if liberty can be reduced by interventions which 
merely make a course of action less desirable, then a person can be rendered less free 
if he is subject to any kind of infl uence by other human agents. I could claim to be made 
less free in term time because I will not go to restaurants for fear of running into pesky 
undergraduates. Any departure from the stance that only interference rendering action 
impossible makes an individual unfree, Steiner maintains, makes freedom dependent 
upon desire and leads to our misconceiving it as a psychological condition rather than 
as a physical fact.
If only prevention of action and not mere intervention in its course can reduce liberty, 
however, what exactly does prevention amount to in this account of liberty as a phys-
ical fact? In Steiner’s theory an agent is prevented from action to the extent that he is 
rendered unable to make use of a portion of physical space or a number of physical 
objects: ‘the greater the amount of physical space and/or material objects the use of 
which is blocked to one individual by another, the greater is the extent of the prevention 
to which the former individual is subject’ (Steiner, 1991, p. 137). A person who is 
imprisoned is thus unfree to the extent that he has use of less space and fewer resources. 
Furthermore, Steiner maintains, some of the persons who are not imprisoned have now 
had their freedom expanded, since they can make use of the space and material objects 
to which the prisoner is denied access. This is because, according to Steiner, freedom 
has to be seen as a fi xed quantity which cannot be expanded or reduced but only redis-
tributed. One person’s loss of freedom must involve another’s gain: the ‘universal quest 
for greater personal liberty is  .  .  .  a zero-sum game’ (Steiner, 1983, pp. 88–9). It is thus 
pointless to talk of maximizing the total amount of freedom; the important normative 
questions are not about the manufacture but about the distribution of freedom.
Steiner’s views, I would like to suggest, are mistaken in important ways. Essentially, 
the idea that freedom has to be understood purely as a physical fact (wholly indepen-
dently of desire) is, in the end, untenable. To see this, we should consider fi rst the idea 
that freedom involves the use or control of physical space and resources. Steiner is quite 
precise: ‘to act is, among other things, to occupy particular portions of physical space 
and to dispose of particular material objects’ (1991, p. 137). For an agent to be free to 
perform an action entails that all the physical components of doing that ‘action are 
(simultaneously) unoccupied and/or disposed of by another’ (ibid., p. 138). In other 
words, the agent must possess that physical space or those material objects, and he 
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possesses an object only ‘when he enjoys exclusive physical control of it, that is, when 
what happens to that object – allowing for the operation of the laws of physics – is not 
subject to the determination of any other agent and is therefore subject only to his own 
determination’. As Steiner prefers to understand the notion, control only obtains when 
an agent is able to render it physically impossible for another to occupy space or use 
an object.
Yet it seems clear that this sort of complete physical control Steiner thinks is neces-
sary for freedom cannot be had. For the most part individuals seeking to exercise control 
over their possessions look to putting in place non-physical impediments to trespass. 
My freedom to use my house, and to exclude the uninvited, is enjoyed not because I 
am capable of physically excluding others but because of a range of non-physical cir-
cumstances: I have title to my property, property rights are respected and can be 
enforced if necessary, and so on. Now it might be maintained that I only have freedom 
to the extent that others do not in fact physically intrude, and that if they do I do not 
have (as much) freedom because I do not control as much physical material. But the 
implication of this strongly physicalist attitude which must be noted is that such things 
as rights, entitlements and laws have to be regarded as having no bearing on liberty. 
This does not appear to be a plausible line of argument. Indeed, if one accepts Steiner’s 
view that we should be concerned primarily about the distribution of liberty, then our 
concerns would most likely be about the rules or laws that affect that distribution, 
rather than with physical impediments.
The implication which has to be – and generally is – accepted, then, is that liberty 
can be affected by interventions which affect the desirability of performing particular 
actions. But we have to deal with the question of which kinds of interventions that 
affect the desirability of an action are to be regarded as freedom restricting – since we 
do not want to say that all infl uences on an action diminish the agent’s liberty by 
making other options less attractive.
One argument, put by F. A. Hayek, is that we only regard as freedom restricting 
those actions which are coercive: ‘ “freedom” refers solely to a relation of men to other 
men, and the only infringement on it is coercion by men’ (Hayek, 1960, p. 12). What 
is striking about Hayek’s formulation is that he maintains that freedom is restricted 
only by coercive intervention by persons; the law, however, does not restrict freedom. 
Freedom, for him, is best described as ‘independence of the arbitrary will of another’ 
(ibid.). But it is also his contention that ‘when we obey laws, in the sense of general 
abstract rules laid down irrespective of their application to us, we are not subject to 
another man’s will and are therefore free’ (ibid., p. 153). There is coercion if a person 
threatens to infl ict harm with the intention of bringing about a change in the conduct 
of a second person (who regards himself as having been made worse off). But there is 
no coercion – and so there is liberty – if the law makes a person worse off and ‘forces’ 
a change in conduct (ibid., pp. 134–6; and see Kukathas, 1989, pp. 150–1).
Hayek’s solution, however, is unsatisfactory on two counts. First, his account of 
coercion is inadequate because it makes many kinds of competitive action appear 
liberty restricting. A trader who intends to infl ict harm on his competitor by lowering 
prices, and brings about a change in conduct (by forcing him out of this line of business) 
would, on Hayek’s defi nition, be infringing liberty. Yet Hayek himself would not want 
to say that this kind of competitive conduct is coercive or liberty diminishing. Second, 
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his suggestion that law does not restrict liberty because any ‘coercion’ implicit in its 
commands and prohibitions is predictable and avoidable is unconvincing: predictable 
coercion remains coercion. While there is merit in Hayek’s attempt to argue that law 
should be viewed as a condition of, rather than an obstacle to, liberty, the theory of 
coercion does not really account for this.
A different solution to the question of which kinds of intervention are freedom 
restricting comes from Robert Nozick. Like Hayek, he thinks that a distinction has to 
be drawn between threats and offers, and while he does not think it right to ‘capsulize 
freedom as absence of coercion’ (Nozick, 1972, p. 101), he also sees liberty as intimately 
bound up with coercion. Moreover, Nozick’s view is in line with Hayek’s in that he sees 
threats, but not offers, as coercive for the reason that ‘when a person does something 
because of threats, the will of another is operating or predominant’ (ibid., p. 128). This 
thought forms the basis of the conception of liberty which is invoked (but not explicitly 
developed) by Nozick in Anarchy, State and Utopia, where it is suggested that interfer-
ence with individual choice makes for liberty infringement (Nozick, 1974, pp. 160–4). 
What has to be noted about this account, however, is that only some kinds of interven-
tion count as interference which involves restriction of liberty. For example, it cannot 
be said that the choices of individuals acting ‘within their rights’ (ibid., p. 262) interfere 
with or restrict the liberty of another individual, even if those choices leave that indi-
vidual with no reasonable options. So if, as a result of others acting within their rights, 
I am left with the choice of working for Robert Maxwell or starving I cannot claim that 
I am forced or coerced into involuntary employment. If, however, Mr Maxwell had 
engineered this situation (say, by stealing from and bankrupting his competitors) I can 
claim to have been forced.
Nozick’s conception of liberty here is one which is dependent upon his conception 
of justice, which in turn is founded upon a view about what rights individuals have 
(since any action which does not violate rights is not unjust). Liberty cannot be violated 
by actions which are just. In some respects this understanding of liberty is consistent 
with our everyday use of the term. We do not normally say that the gang member’s 
liberty is lost because the law forbids assault and battery. Nonetheless, the problem with 
Nozick’s conception of liberty is that it is so dependent upon a theory of rights which is 
never fully expounded. Furthermore, tying liberty so intimately to another substantial 
moral value risks depriving the notion of liberty of independent force in political 
argument.
This latter objection lies at the centre of G. A. Cohen’s criticisms of Nozick’s view of 
freedom. According to Cohen, because Nozick sees only illegitimate actions as capable 
of violating liberty he is operating with a ‘moralized’ notion of freedom. This allows 
Nozick to ignore many situations in which people are ‘forced’ by circumstances such 
as poverty to take or to forgo particular options. Nozick’s ‘moralized’ defi nition allows 
him to deny that the indigent are necessarily unfree since the mark of unfreedom is not 
the absence of options or opportunities but the violation of (a narrow range of) rights 
(Cohen, 1978). Yet Cohen’s critique of Nozick may not be as telling as he suggests. 
While rejecting ‘moralized’ conceptions of freedom, Cohen does not deny that we are 
concerned here with freedom as it relates to interaction between human agents. We 
are not concerned with those obstacles which are not subject to human infl uence. 
Someone whose path has been blocked by a rockslide is not unfree, although unable, 
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to continue on that route – unless someone can be held responsible for the creation of 
(or failure to remove) that obstacle, in which case we would say the traveller is not 
merely unable to journey but unfree to do so. The important issue, however, as David 
Miller makes clear, is that of the basis upon which we determine whether someone can 
be held responsible, for this will determine whether or not we can regard an obstacle 
as a constraint on freedom. This is a moral issue, and an answer to it cannot be morally 
neutral (Miller, 1983, p. 72). Nozick has not provided a morally neutral account of 
what counts as a constraint on freedom, but neither can one be expected. There is, 
however, the stronger criticism of Nozick that he does not merely offer a morally non-
neutral defi nition of freedom, but a view that says that morally justifi ed interferences 
do not restrict liberty; the defi nition is thus ‘moralized’. But this is not quite the case. 
In Nozick’s theory the domain of individual liberty is specifi ed by (rights-based) prin-
ciples of justice. Morally justifi able interferences with individual liberty (to avoid ‘cata-
strophic moral horror’, for example; Nozick, 1974, p. 30) do restrict liberty. However, 
they restrict liberty not because they are unjustifi ed but because they are unjust. 
Nozick invokes a justicized account of liberty, but not a moralized one (J. Gray, 1986, 
p. 169).
Nonetheless, this does not mean that Nozick’s approach to specifying what counts 
as a constraint on freedom is satisfactory. For Nozick justice can never compete with 
liberty; justice cannot violate liberty. Yet this seems too strong a demand; there may 
well be times when liberty must be violated for justice to be done. For example, uphold-
ing justice in rectifi cation by transferring property rights may infringe the liberty of 
those whose justly acquired property is now taken. Specifying what makes for 
constraints upon liberty may be a more complicated matter than Nozick’s theory 
suggests.
This point is brought out with especial clarity by Nancy Hirschmann in her feminist 
analysis of freedom. It is not possible properly to appreciate the nature of freedom, she 
suggests, without coming to terms with the social construction of the self. An important 
part of freedom may consist in removing obstacles to the fulfi lment of our desires; but 
we cannot evade the question of what kinds of desires we acquire as if it had nothing 
to do with the question of freedom. If social institutions construct subjects who accept 
violence against their persons, or who become dependant on welfare, or resist the 
impositions of their cultural groups, freedom is at stake. The task, however, is to account 
for this loss of freedom without losing sight of the idea of freedom captured by the idea 
of negative liberty (Hirschmann, 2003).
These attempts to specify what counts as a constraint upon individual liberty illus-
trate the diffi culty of developing an uncontroversial conception of liberty. In part, this 
may simply refl ect the ‘essential contestability’ of the concept. The more important 
reason, however, is that judgements about freedom cannot be insulated completely 
from other evaluative questions and from issues in social theory. While it should be 
recognized that freedom requires the absence of obstruction, and that coercive behav-
iour (which penalizes or frustrates action) restricts liberty, it is a matter of moral argu-
ment what precisely qualifi es as an obstruction, or constitutes coercive behaviour. 
Rawls, for example, suggests that a person is obstructed by others if they fail to uphold 
the rights or perform the duties which they are obliged to. ‘If, for example, we consider 
liberty of conscience as defi ned by law, then individuals have this liberty when they are 
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free to pursue their moral, philosophical, or religious interests without legal restrictions 
requiring them to engage or not to engage in any particular form of religious or other 
practice, and when other men have a legal duty not to interfere’ (Rawls, 1971, pp. 
202–3). Yet what is crucial here is the specifi cation of the relevant rights and duties. 
Whether or not any particular individual is free according to a Rawlsian conception of 
liberty may be a purely descriptive matter insofar as it is necessary only for us to enquire 
whether or not he is actually obstructed to establish whether he is free. But what counts 
as an obstruction under that conception is an evaluative matter which requires the 
development of arguments in moral and social theory (Berlin, 1979a; J. Gray, 1984). 
Thus we should expect to fi nd that different political theories or ideologies, even if they 
should accept the core understanding of negative liberty as the absence of interference, 
will embrace quite different conceptions of liberty.
Liberty: Liberal and Republican
What, then, would make for a free society? One prominent answer in modern thinking 
about liberty is that a free society is fundamentally a liberal society. It is the answer 
offered by Berlin (1979a), as well as by other contemporary theorists such as John 
Rawls, F. A. Hayek and James Buchanan (1975). Liberalism has, in recent times, come 
under severe criticism for a range of alleged inadequacies – for overvaluing justice and 
for undervaluing community, among other things (Sandel, 1982). But since liberty is 
often taken to be the core value upheld by liberalism, it is worth examining its claim to 
being the philosophy of a free society.
The most substantial challenge to liberalism’s libertarian credentials has come from 
Quentin Skinner in a series of papers (1984; 1991) criticizing liberal conceptions of 
negative liberty and advancing a ‘republican’ conception of negative liberty. Skinner’s 
primary claim is that there is something unsatisfactory about liberalism’s reliance on 
a particular notion of negative liberty merely as the absence of interference. His targets 
are the Hobbesian notions that liberty consists in the absence of external impediments 
to motion, and that in political society the ‘greatest liberty of subjects, dependeth on 
the silence of the law’, since law is an obstacle to liberty (Hobbes, [1651] 1968, II, 21, 
143). His criticism of liberalism is largely a criticism of the legal theories of writers like 
Jeremy Bentham, for whom law itself must be viewed as an invasion of liberty. Skinner 
himself seeks to uphold a negative conception of liberty; but it is the particular negative 
conception associated with the notion of law as a fetter on freedom, which he associates 
with liberalism, that he seeks to criticize.
To see why Skinner may have a point we might consider again the case of the slave 
who enjoys a good measure of negative liberty, and yet chooses not to escape. However 
much negative liberty the slave might enjoy, there is something unsatisfactory about 
this liberty. The reason, essentially, is that he is not secure in its possession. Whether 
or not, and for how long, he is able to exercise that liberty is subject to the good will 
and the good fortune of the master. In Philip Pettit’s useful term, his liberty has no 
‘resilience’ (Pettit, 1993). Thus we fi nd, for example, that even the most contented 
slaves, living under the kindest masters, in Uncle Tom’s Cabin want manumission for 
fear that, should their masters die or be forced to sell them, their lives could instantly 
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be transformed for the worse. The point here was well recognized by Edmund Burke in 
arguing against the Chatham Methodists in 1773. The Methodists objected to a 
Bill for the relief of Protestant Dissenters on the grounds that Dissenters did in fact 
enjoy a measure of liberty, and that it would be dangerous to grant it to them as a 
matter of law. To Burke, however, this was ‘liberty under a connivance’, which he 
rejected because ‘connivance is a relaxation from slavery, not a defi nition of liberty. 
What is connivance, but a state under which all slaves live? If I was to describe 
slavery, I would say, with those who hate it, it is living under will, not under law’ 
(Burke, 1970, p. 77).
Skinner’s concern is that liberty exercised in spite of the law, rather than enjoyed 
under its protection, is insecure – indeed, no more than liberty under a connivance – 
and will soon be lost. His argument is that what are needed are social institutions which 
will better assure individuals of their liberty. More specifi cally, we need institutions 
which make for active self-government, even to the point of coercing citizens into per-
forming their public duties and so ‘upholding a liberty which, left to ourselves, we 
would have undermined’ (Skinner, 1991, p. 186). The target of Skinner’s criticism is 
contemporary liberalism, ‘especially in its so-called libertarian form’ which, by threat-
ening to sweep ‘the public arena bare of any concepts save those of self-interest 
and individual rights’, threatens also our rights and liberties themselves (Skinner, 
1991, p. 204).
Skinner’s contention that it is the liberty that is enjoyed under the protection of the 
laws which is the liberty to be sought is entirely persuasive, I would suggest, because 
the contrast it draws is that between free individuals and slaves. In the moral world, 
the opposite of liberty is slavery. (See Patterson, 1991, for a discussion of the origin 
of the ideal of freedom in the experience of slavery.) What is more disputable, however, 
is whether he is right to say that it is the institutions of self-government, underpinned 
by the enforcement of republican virtue, which are going to preserve that liberty. 
Equally contestable is the claim that liberalism, with its emphasis on individual rights, 
is a threat to that liberty. Indeed, the very idea that liberalism necessarily views law as 
invasive of liberty is questionable. Hayek, for example, has consistently argued that law 
is not invasive of liberty but its necessary precondition.
The liberal and republican traditions are not always easy to disentangle. One reason 
for this is that both attach great value to institutions which check, and attempt to 
control, political power. Both emphasize the importance of the rule of law, of constitu-
tional government and of the separation of powers for the preservation of a free society. 
Yet where they might be seen to differ is over the question of how political power is to 
be checked. Republicans, like Skinner and Pettit (see also Pettit, 1989; 1992), seem to 
suggest that it is best checked by political institutions which increase public participa-
tion and so increase the accountability of the executive power (though Pettit maintains 
that his understanding of republicanism is neither communitarian nor populist; see 
Pettit, 1996, p. 8). Liberals, I would suggest, are less impressed by such checks within 
the structure of political institutions because they do not serve suffi ciently to disperse 
power in society. It is not the political separation of powers that is vital but their social 
separation. While republicans are concerned ‘to improve the accountability of our soi 
disant representatives’ (Skinner, 1991, p. 204), they also look to extending the power 
of the (‘checked and controlled’) state both to empower (Pettit, 1992, p. 30) and to 
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coerce its citizens. Liberals, while they might accept that institutional checks are of 
some value, insist that it is the accumulation of power which is the danger – above all, 
to liberty.
It is in this context that one should understand the liberal preoccupation with indi-
vidual rights and liberties rather than public duties. Asserting such claims on behalf of 
individuals is intended to deny power to the state by limiting the scope of legitimate 
public concern. There are at least two reasons for limiting the scope of the public 
domain, both of which bear upon liberty. The fi rst is one alluded to by J. S. Mill when 
he wrote:
If the roads, the railways, the banks, the insurance offi ces, the great joint-stock companies, 
the universities, and the public charities, were all of them branches of the government; if, 
in addition, the municipal corporations and local boards, with all that now devolves on 
them, become departments of the central administration; if the employés of all these dif-
ferent enterprises were appointed and paid by the government, and look to the government 
for every rise in life; not all the freedom of the press and popular constitution of the legis-
lature would make this or any other country free otherwise than in name. (Mill, [1859] 
1985, pp. 244–5)
Mill’s fear was partly that such power would convert ‘the active and ambitious part of 
the public’ into ‘hangers-on’ of the government. But the greater danger was that, as 
the more able were drawn into government offi ce because ‘every part of the business 
of society which required organized concert, or large and comprehensive views’ was in 
the hands of government, there would be fewer people among those outside capable, 
‘for want of practical experience’, of criticizing or checking the government’s mode of 
operation (ibid., p. 245). An extensive public power would weaken public life.
The second reason for diminishing the scope of the public domain is to be found in 
an argument advanced by Edmund Burke, who maintained that ‘the state ought to 
confi ne itself to what regards the state’, and not embroil itself in the affairs of society. 
For as rulers ‘descend from the state to a province, from a province to a parish, and 
from a parish to a private house, they go on accelerated in their fall. They cannot do the 
lower duty; and in proportion as they try it, they will certainly fail in the higher. They 
ought to know the different departments of things, – what belongs to laws, and what 
manners alone can regulate’ (Burke, 1970, p. 31). As the state expands it will perform 
all its functions less well, and particularly its primary function of upholding the peace 
and security which is necessary for liberty (ibid., p. 65). Once again, the argument is 
that expanding the scope of the public domain weakens the public in its capacity to 
supply a check upon executive rule.
If these points are sound, then what is needed to uphold liberty is a set of institutions 
which foster individual responsibility and protect certain individual rights – and not 
institutions which purport to make for public virtue. Whether or not these points are 
sound, however, is a matter of social theory, which cannot be easily resolved here. If 
questions of liberty are to be answered there must be recourse to social theory. (This is 
a point made by Berlin; for a discussion see J. Gray, 1984.) The contention which can 
only be asserted here is that for answers we should turn not to the classical republicans 
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